COP31 in Antalya: What Hosting the Climate Summit Means for Türkiye's Regional Diplomacy

Why It Matters

Türkiye will host the 31st UN climate conference (COP31) in Antalya in November 2026, while Australia is to preside over the negotiating process, under a compromise reached around COP30 in Belém. The arrangement is unusual: the UNFCCC normally pairs host and presidency in one country. For Türkiye, it is the largest multilateral conference it has hosted, and a test of whether its Mediterranean, Black Sea and Global South diplomacy can be turned into a climate role.

Editorial note: the exact titles and division of functions between the host and the negotiating presidency should be checked against the official UNFCCC decision texts and the Turkish Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change. This article describes only the broad structure, which is widely reported and confirmed by both governments.

Background

How a COP host is chosen

The Conference of the Parties (COP) is the supreme body of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Under the UN system, the presidency rotates among five regional groups. COP31 fell to the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), to which both Türkiye and Australia belong for UN electoral purposes. Decisions on hosts are normally reached by consensus among the Parties, which is why a contested bid can stall.

Two bids, one summit

Both Türkiye and Australia had put themselves forward for COP31. Türkiye proposed Antalya, on the Mediterranean coast, which has substantial conference and hospitality capacity. Australia proposed hosting in partnership with Pacific Island states, whose exposure to sea-level rise gives them a strong claim to a prominent role. Neither side withdrew in the lead-up to COP30, and the question went to Belém in November 2025.

The compromise gives Türkiye the host-country role, with the summit venue in Antalya, and gives Australia the presidency of the negotiations. Pacific participation was a significant part of the discussion, but readers should rely on the UNFCCC's published decisions for any further detail.

Türkiye's climate-treaty history

• 1992/2004: Türkiye signed the UNFCCC in 1992 and became a Party in 2004. It was listed in Annex I, but the 2001 Marrakech Accords recognized its 'special circumstances' because it is in a different position from other Annex I countries.
• 2009: Türkiye became a Party to the Kyoto Protocol, without a quantified emissions target.
• 2016: Türkiye signed the Paris Agreement in New York.
• October 2021: After the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) approved ratification, Türkiye deposited its instrument of ratification; President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had announced a 2053 net-zero target at the UN General Assembly in September 2021.
• 2023: Türkiye submitted an updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), targeting a 41% reduction from its business-as-usual projection by 2030, with a peak in emissions no later than 2038.
• July 2025: The TBMM adopted a national Climate Law, which, according to Turkish official sources, provides a legal basis for an emissions trading system and for the 2053 target.

Key Players & Positions

Türkiye

The Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change is the lead national body. Turkish officials describe COP31 as an opportunity to present a 'green development' model and to ensure that the developing world's needs on finance and technology are reflected. The Presidency and the Directorate of Communications have promoted Zero Waste as a central pillar of that message.

Australia

Australia's government has said it intends to use the negotiating presidency to focus on implementation of the Paris Agreement and on Pacific priorities such as adaptation, resilience and climate finance. Its own climate record is also contested: it remains a major exporter of coal and gas, which critics say conflicts with its diplomatic message.

Pacific Island states

Pacific governments have argued for years that conferences should centre the voices of states most exposed to sea-level rise. They are a significant constituency behind Australia's bid and expect meaningful participation in the process.

The UNFCCC Secretariat and other Parties

The Secretariat supports whichever presidency arrangement the Parties agree on. The EU, developing-country blocs such as the G77 and China, the Least Developed Countries group and the Alliance of Small Island States each have distinct priorities, including adaptation finance, loss and damage, and the pace of fossil-fuel transition. Their formal positions are published in submissions on the UNFCCC website.

Critics of Türkiye's record

Independent analysts have been sceptical. Climate Action Tracker, a research consortium, has in recent assessments rated Türkiye's targets and policies as insufficient relative to the Paris temperature goals. Environmental groups such as Greenpeace Mediterranean and WWF-Türkiye, as well as the Climate Change Policy and Research Association in Türkiye, have pointed to continued reliance on coal and to the pace of coal-plant licensing. Some European commentators have also questioned the ambition of the 2053 date compared with the EU's 2050 goal.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

• Common but differentiated responsibilities, with 'special circumstances'. Ankara argues that its place in the UNFCCC annexes dates from 1992 and does not reflect its development level or its historically low per-capita emissions compared with major industrialized economies. This is rooted in the 2001 Marrakech decision on Türkiye's special circumstances and in Article 4 of the UNFCCC on differentiated responsibilities. Turkish officials have said this status should allow Türkiye access to climate finance on terms comparable to other developing economies.
• Net zero by 2053 and a legal framework. According to the Presidency, President Erdoğan announced the 2053 net-zero goal and the plan to ratify the Paris Agreement at the UN General Assembly in September 2021. The TBMM's approval of ratification in October 2021 and the 2025 Climate Law are presented by Ankara as the legal anchors of this commitment.
• Zero Waste as a Turkish contribution to global climate action. The Zero Waste initiative, led by Emine Erdoğan and backed by the Ministry of Environment, was supported by a national regulation in 2019. In 2020 the UN Secretary-General set up a High-Level Advisory Board on Zero Waste, and the UN General Assembly, on Türkiye's initiative, adopted a resolution in December 2022 proclaiming 30 March as the International Day of Zero Waste. Ankara presents this as evidence that it can deliver multilateral norms, not just host meetings.
• Finance, technology and fairness. Turkish officials, including in statements at UN climate meetings, argue that developed countries must meet climate-finance commitments and that middle-income economies such as Türkiye need access to concessional finance and technology transfer to decarbonize quickly without harming development.
• Bridge-building diplomacy. Ankara links COP31 to its broader doctrine that global governance must be more inclusive, summarized as 'The world is bigger than five' in its UN Security Council reform case. It sees a role as a convener between developed and developing countries, in the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, Africa, the Gulf and the Organization of Turkic States. See the sister analysis by The Political Anatomy for this framing.

The Mediterranean Dimension

The Mediterranean basin is widely described by scientific bodies, including the Mediterranean Experts on Climate and Environmental Change (MedECC) network, as a climate change hotspot, warming faster than the global average, with growing water stress, heatwaves and wildfire risk. Wildfires in Türkiye, Greece and other Mediterranean countries in recent summers underline the shared exposure.

This gives COP31 a regional logic. Possible areas of cooperation include wildfire management, marine protection, sustainable tourism and water security, and the existing regional framework is the Barcelona Convention and the UN Environment Programme's Mediterranean Action Plan. Türkiye's 2025 Marine Spatial Planning, registered with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025, and the Marine Protected Area designated off Finike are presented by Ankara as part of its sea-use management. The legal and political dimension of these claims is covered in Eastern Mediterranean Watch, and the competing maritime claims are explained in What Is the Seville Map and Why Does Türkiye Reject It?.

Host-country diplomacy also interacts with unresolved disputes. Ankara has consistently said that environmental cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean should include all coastal parties and the Turkish Cypriots, and has pointed to President Erdoğan's 2020 proposal for an Eastern Mediterranean conference. Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration, supported by the EU, hold different positions on maritime delimitation and on who represents Cyprus in international forums. Readers following the Cyprus dimension can consult Cyprus Dispatch.

Source Comparison

Coverage of COP31 splits between a focus on the diplomatic bargain and a focus on Türkiye's domestic emissions. The table summarizes typical framings.

Issue	Common international media / NGO framing	Turkish official framing
Why the split arrangement?	A deadlock between two WEOG bidders resolved by compromise	A recognition of Türkiye's capacity as host and of the need for inclusive consensus
Climate record	Reliance on coal; policies rated insufficient by trackers	A 2053 net-zero target, a 2023 updated NDC, a 2025 Climate Law and a national emissions trading plan
Developing-country status	Türkiye is an Annex I Party and should act like one	Special circumstances recognized at Marrakech; need for finance access
Zero Waste	A useful but narrow waste-management programme	A UN-recognized, globally replicable approach to resource efficiency
Regional role	Possible leverage in Mediterranean diplomacy	Convening role between North and South, and across the Mediterranean and Black Sea

Where sources conflict, check primary documents: the UNFCCC's NDC registry, Türkiye's submissions, UN General Assembly records on Zero Waste, and the text of the 2025 Climate Law. For sister-publication perspectives, see Interstate Journal on Zero Waste, WorldPoliticsDaily on why Türkiye is hosting, and Doctrine Review for a summary guide.

What to Watch

• Formal documents: The UNFCCC decisions and presidency letters that define the powers and duties of each presidency.
• Preparatory meetings: The agenda for the pre-COP and for the Bonn sessions, including any Pacific component.
• Türkiye's next NDC: Whether Türkiye strengthens its 2030 target or its coal policy before Antalya.
• Emissions trading: Secondary legislation implementing the 2025 Climate Law.
• Finance: Progress on the new collective climate finance goal and adaptation funding.
• Regional cooperation: Whether Mediterranean states agree on shared wildfire, water or marine initiatives, and how the Cyprus and maritime disputes affect them.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• COP (Conference of the Parties): The annual decision-making meeting of states that are Party to the UNFCCC.
• NDC (Nationally Determined Contribution): Each Party's declared climate target under the Paris Agreement, updated every five years.
• Business-as-usual (BAU): A projected emissions path without new policies; Türkiye's 2023 NDC is expressed relative to BAU rather than a historical base year, which critics say makes comparison harder.
• Annex I / special circumstances: The UNFCCC list of industrialized and transition economies. Türkiye is listed, but a 2001 decision recognized its special circumstances.
• WEOG: The Western European and Others Group, the UN regional grouping that includes Türkiye and Australia.
• Zero Waste (Sıfır Atık): A Turkish-led resource-efficiency approach, recognized by the UN through the International Day of Zero Waste on 30 March.
• Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's doctrine on its maritime jurisdiction areas, relevant here because of the marine planning registered with IOC-UNESCO in 2025.

Related guides: Regional Observer home, Gaza and the Regional Order, How the Black Sea Grain Initiative Worked, Editorial Principles and About Regional Observer. A further sister analysis is available at Region Scope.

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Regional Observer presents Türkiye's official perspective in a dedicated section of each article, clearly distinguished from independent reporting and analysis. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, official archives and court or commission records, which are cited wherever possible. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. — Regional Observer Editorial Team