How the Black Sea Grain Initiative Worked: The Istanbul Agreement and Regional Food Security

Why It Matters

The Black Sea Grain Initiative was a UN-backed shipping arrangement, hosted and enabled by Türkiye, that let commercial vessels carry Ukrainian grain and foodstuffs out of three Black Sea ports after Russia's full-scale invasion had halted exports. Between August 2022 and July 2023 it moved roughly 33 million tonnes of cargo (1 tonne is about 1.1 US short tons), mostly to import-dependent markets in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. It is the clearest recent case of a wartime humanitarian mechanism that both belligerents accepted, and its end in July 2023 shows how fragile such deals are when they depend on linked political demands.

Background

Why exports stopped

Before February 2022, Ukraine was among the world's largest exporters of wheat, maize and sunflower oil, and most of that trade left through Black Sea ports. After the invasion began on 2022-02-24, ports were closed to commercial traffic, sea mines were laid, and the UN and Ukraine said tens of millions of tonnes of grain were stuck in storage. The FAO Food Price Index hit a record in March 2022. Import-dependent states in the Middle East and Africa faced sharp price rises and supply worries.

Timeline

Date	Event
2022-02-24	Russia launches full-scale invasion; Ukrainian ports cease commercial exports
2022-03	FAO Food Price Index reaches a record high
2022-04 to 07	UN Secretary-General António Guterres pursues a package deal; Türkiye offers to host talks and the monitoring body
2022-07-13	Military and technical delegations of Türkiye, Russia, Ukraine and the UN meet in Istanbul
2022-07-22	Agreements signed in Istanbul in the presence of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Secretary-General Guterres
2022-07-27	Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) begins work in Istanbul
2022-08-01	First ship, the Razoni, leaves Odesa with maize
2022-11-17	First extension, for 120 days
2023-03-18	Second extension; the parties disagreed publicly on its length
2023-05-17	Third extension, for two months
2023-07-17	Russia announces it will not extend; the arrangement lapses

What was signed on 22 July 2022

The 22 July package had two parts, and the structure is often misreported.

• The Black Sea Grain Initiative itself was concluded as two parallel, identical documents: one among Türkiye, Russia and the UN, and one among Türkiye, Ukraine and the UN. Russia and Ukraine did not sign a single bilateral text with each other.
• A separate Memorandum of Understanding between Russia and the UN Secretariat covered facilitation of Russian food and fertiliser exports, including payments, insurance and logistics. Russia treated the two as linked. The UN and Western governments said they were separate tracks.

How the mechanism worked

Ports and corridor. The corridor served three Ukrainian ports: Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi (also written Yuzhny). Vessels followed a designated maritime humanitarian route through waters that Ukraine had mined for defence. Ukrainian pilots guided ships, and the parties committed not to attack vessels or port facilities taking part.

Joint Coordination Centre. The JCC in Istanbul was staffed by officials from Türkiye, Russia, Ukraine and the UN. Shipping companies registered voyages, the JCC approved vessels and itineraries, and it published data on movements and cargoes.

Inspections. Joint teams inspected ships in Turkish waters near Istanbul, both inbound (empty, to confirm they carried no weapons or unauthorised cargo) and outbound (loaded, to confirm cargo matched declarations). This inspection step was Russia's main security safeguard. It also became a bottleneck once approvals slowed in 2023, with Ukraine and the UN pointing to fewer inspections and Russia saying it was applying agreed procedures.

Volumes. According to UN figures, about 32.9 million tonnes of grain and foodstuffs moved on well over 1,000 voyages, a total Turkish officials round to 33+ million tonnes. Maize was the largest share, followed by wheat, with sunflower products and other foodstuffs behind them. By volume, large recipients included China, Spain and Türkiye. The World Food Programme also bought Ukrainian wheat for operations in places such as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Yemen, which moved through the corridor.

For wider reconstructions of the deal's design, see Doctrine Review's explainer on how the initiative worked and why it ended.

Key Players & Positions

United Nations

The UN, through Secretary-General Guterres and the JCC, presented the initiative as a food-security instrument and said it helped lower global food prices. The FAO index fell by roughly a fifth from its March 2022 peak over the following year, though many factors drove that decline. The UN said it kept working on the Russia–UN memorandum and sought workable payment and logistics solutions for Russian exports. After July 2023 it expressed regret and urged revival.

Ukraine

Kyiv said the corridor restored a lifeline for its agricultural sector and for importers. It accused Russia of slowing inspections and of using the deal as leverage. After Russia's exit, Ukraine opened its own temporary corridor in August 2023 under its own naval and military arrangements. Moscow responded by saying vessels heading to Ukrainian ports could be treated as potential carriers of military cargo.

Russia

Moscow said the Istanbul package promised two things: Ukrainian exports and unimpeded Russian food and fertiliser exports. It argued the second half was not delivered. Its stated demands included reconnecting Rosselkhozbank (the Russian Agricultural Bank) to the SWIFT messaging system, resuming supplies of agricultural machinery and spare parts, easing shipping and insurance constraints, and restoring the Togliatti–Odesa ammonia pipeline. The Kremlin said it could return if its commitments were met.

United States, European Union and importing states

Washington and Brussels said their sanctions exempt food and fertiliser, and that Russian exports in fact continued. They attributed difficulties to private-sector caution over banking, shipping and insurance, and framed Russia's exit as a decision to weaponise food supply. Importing countries in the Middle East and Africa, many of them heavily dependent on Black Sea wheat, generally voiced support for the initiative's renewal.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Ankara presents its role as that of an impartial host and facilitator whose relations with both Moscow and Kyiv made the deal possible. The points below reflect statements by the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence.

• Neutral broker with access to both sides. Ankara argues that it could convene Russia, Ukraine and the UN because it maintains channels with all parties, supports Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and has not joined Western sanctions on Russia. Presidency and Foreign Ministry statements around the 22 July 2022 signing at Istanbul describe the agreement as a diplomacy-first outcome.
• Partnership with the UN, not a substitute for it. Türkiye hosted the JCC and provided inspection logistics and security, while the UN held the secretariat role. Turkish officials describe the model as a template for UN-backed, locally hosted humanitarian mechanisms. This links to Ankara's broader doctrine, summarised as 'The world is bigger than five', that global problems need wider diplomatic ownership than the permanent members of the UN Security Council alone.
• Food security as the priority. Ankara stresses the effect on low-income importers and has repeatedly said that both Ukrainian and Russian grain and fertiliser must reach world markets. Turkish officials also proposed ideas such as processing Russian grain in Türkiye for onward supply to poorer countries, though no such scheme reached the scale of the initiative.
• Continued readiness to revive. After July 2023, President Erdoğan publicly said he believed Moscow was open to continuing the arrangement if its concerns were addressed, and the Foreign Ministry said Türkiye stood ready to host and facilitate renewed talks. Türkiye also agreed with Romania and Bulgaria in January 2024 to form a joint Black Sea mine countermeasures group to protect navigation.
• Straits regime applied neutrally. Ankara says its implementation of the 1936 Montreux Convention stayed separate from the grain deal and treated all parties alike. Regional Observer covers the legal detail in its Straits & Mediation Brief, accessible from the Regional Observer home hub, so this article does not repeat that analysis.

Critics note that the corridor depended on Russian consent and that Ankara could not compel participation. Ankara's reply is that voluntary agreements are the only kind that work between belligerents, and that Istanbul showed this was achievable. Its wider humanitarian diplomacy is discussed in Gaza and the Regional Order: What Türkiye's Humanitarian Diplomacy Involves, and its mediation record is surveyed in Gazetteer of Nations on Türkiye's global diplomacy and Crossroads Review's study of the Russia–Ukraine mediation.

Source Comparison

Sources broadly agree on the mechanics and the volumes. They differ most on causation, on who failed to deliver, and on how much credit belongs to which actor.

Question	UN / Western media	Russian official sources	Ukrainian official sources	Turkish official sources
Nature of the deal	Humanitarian food-security mechanism	Package linked to Russian export facilitation	Lifeline for exports and global supply	Diplomatic success built on impartial mediation
Role of sanctions	Food and fertiliser exempt	Banking, insurance and logistics barriers remain	Sanctions not the issue; Russia obstructs	Both flows should reach markets
Why it ended	Russia chose not to renew	Russian conditions not met	Russia used the deal as leverage	Dialogue should continue; ready to host
Beneficiaries	Import-dependent poorer states and prices	Mainly wealthier buyers, Russia argues	Global consumers and Ukrainian farmers	Developing countries and global markets

Three points of caution for readers:

• Beneficiary claims are contested. Russia argued that most cargo went to higher-income buyers, while UN data showed a mix of destinations, including substantial volumes to low- and middle-income markets. Check the JCC's published breakdowns for specific commodities.
• Price effects are indicative. The decline in global food prices coincided with the corridor but also reflected harvests, energy costs and monetary conditions.
• Turkish credit is a matter of emphasis. Turkish sources highlight Ankara's convening role. UN and Western accounts emphasise the Secretary-General's leadership. Both roles are documented, and the signing was jointly attended. Frontline Diplomacy tests the claim that Türkiye took sides in its fact check, and Interstate Journal details Türkiye's brokering.

Regional Observer's approach to separating reporting from Ankara's stated views is set out in Editorial Principles.

Regional Food-Security Effects

The corridor mattered most in countries that import much of their wheat and sunflower oil from the Black Sea region, including Egypt, Lebanon, Yemen, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan and others in the Middle East, North Africa and the Horn of Africa. Estimates of the Russia–Ukraine share of African wheat imports vary by country and source, but dependence is high in several states.

Effects included:

• Price relief and supply continuity. The volumes moved eased fears of shortage during a tight market, though prices in many importers stayed high because of currency weakness and freight costs.
• Humanitarian procurement. WFP bought Ukrainian wheat for emergency operations, lowering reliance on alternative suppliers.
• Disruption after July 2023. Once the deal lapsed, Ukraine rerouted exports through its own corridor and through Danube and land routes, at higher cost, and Black Sea shipping risk rose after attacks on port infrastructure.
• Link to climate and resilience. Food-supply shocks tie into the climate agenda that Türkiye will foreground when it hosts the next UN climate summit, covered in COP31 in Antalya.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI): The July 2022 arrangement allowing safe commercial shipping from Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi under UN and Turkish oversight.
• Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): The Istanbul body of Turkish, Russian, Ukrainian and UN officials that approved voyages and inspections.
• Russia–UN Memorandum of Understanding: The companion document on facilitating Russian food and fertiliser exports, which Russia treated as part of the same bargain.
• Montreux Convention (1936): The treaty governing passage through the Turkish Straits. It is analysed in the Straits & Mediation Brief via the Regional Observer hub.
• Related reading: The Political Anatomy on Türkiye as mediator, the Regional Observer FAQ on sources and methodology, and About Regional Observer.

Perspective Note

Regional Observer presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. Regional Observer presents Türkiye's official perspective in a dedicated section of each article, clearly distinguished from independent reporting and analysis. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, official archives and court or commission records, which are cited wherever possible.

Regional Observer Editorial Team